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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
Pursuant to Section 78-2-2 (4), Utah Code Annotated, the Supreme Court 
transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. The jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court is under 78-2-2 by reason of this being an appeal from a final Order 
of the District Court. The Appellate Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 78-2a-3 (2)(j) by 
reason of the transfer from the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
There is a factual dispute of a sufficient nature to warrant the denial of 
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(I)n reviewing a grant of Summary Judgment, we view the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). 
The Supreme Court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, and will affirm only where it appears that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to Judgment as a matter 
of law. Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807,2000 Utah 16, rehearing denied (2000). 
Summary Judgments present for review conclusions of law only, because, by definition, 
Summary Judgments do not resolve factual issues. Thus, we accord no deference to the 
Trial Court, but review its conclusion for correctness. Jeppson v. State Department of 
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Corrections, 846 P.2d 485, 486 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Citations omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
1. Rule 56. Summary judgment, (c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The 
Motion, Memoranda, and Affidavit shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA4-
501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
Interrogatories, and Admissions on file, together with the Affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material facts and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A Summary Judgment, interlocutory in character may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount 
of damages. 
2. Section 57-11-2 (8) "Subdivided means the owner of any interest in 
subdivided lands who offers them for disposition or the principal agent of an inactive 
owner. 
(9) "Subdivision" and "Subdivided Lands" Means land which is divided or is 
proposed to be divided for the purpose of disposition into ten (10) or more units 
including land, whether it is contiguous or not if ten (10) or more units are offered as a 
part of a common promotional plan of advertising and sale. If a subdivision is offered by 
a developer or a group of developers, and the land is contiguous or is known, designated, 
or advertised as a common tract or by common name, that name is presumed, without 
regard to the number of units covered by each individual offering, to be part of a 
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common promotional plan. 
(10) "Unit" includes any lot, parcel, or other interest in land separately offered for 
disposition. 
3. Section 57-11-7 Utah Code Annotated. Attached as Addendum. 
4. Rule 4-501 CJA. Attached as Addendum. 
STA TEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Appellant initiated the action herein by reason of a landslide. The 
landslide was the result of a scarp created by a stream undercutting the toe of the hill of 
Plaintiffs/Appellant's residential lot. The land instability was an inherent defect in the 
residential lot which should have been disclosed to the Plaintiff7Appellant and was not 
disclosed either by intentional misrepresentation or negligent omission. The 
Defendants/Appellees variously were aware of the unstable land and/or should have been 
aware of it and/or were advised as to the necessity of putting the residence of 
Plaintiff/Appellant as far away from the unstable portion of the land as possible and, 
thereby, the Defendants/Appellees had a duty to inform Plaintifi7Appellant as to the 
defect of the residential lot of which Plaintiff/Appellant was unaware. The 
Defendants/Appellees each filed Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff/Appellant 
filed his responses controverting the facts and the law relied upon by 
Defendants/Appellees. Upon hearing of the Summary Judgment motions, the Court 
granted the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment dismissing 
5 
Plaintiffs/Appellant's cause of action. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
The Trial Court indicated a bias in asserting that the bringing of the lawsuit was a 
matter of perspective because land was falling off of hills in other parts of the City of 
Layton by stating, "Fingers are being pointed everywhere..." (Re of Tnscrpt, p. 39). The 
Court further felt there was no liability on the part of Defendants/Appellees as Layton 
City had approved the building lot. (Re of Tnscrpt, p. 54). Moreover, the Court viewed 
the matter as being of public record which would have put Plaintiff/Appellant on notice. 
(Re Tnscrpt, p. 55). The Court indicated that prior to subjecting itself to a full blown 
trial of the facts, it was the Court's desire to have Appellate Court direction as to what 
law to apply. Further, the Court made a finding that there are no disputed facts. (Re 
Tnscrpt, p. 92 and 93). Finally, the Court viewed the soils report generated by the soils 
engineer for the Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green as being an approval of the 
unstable lot for construction which is clearly contrary to the evidence submitted to the 
Court (Re Tnscrpt, p. 54). 
The Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green had a partnership in the development 
of Falcon Ridge Subdivision (Ex. 1 to Plaintiffs Resp. Mem., p. 4). With respect to the 
development the Defendant/Appellee Wall contacted Glenn Maughn for a soils report 
(pp. 10 & 11). The upshot of the soils report was that a certain distance needed to be 
maintained from the hillside (pp. 17 & 18). As to the defect of the land, there was no 
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warning placed on the plat of any stated lot requirements (p. 20). Defendant/Appellee 
Wall had a discussion with Green after the filing of the lawsuit herein wherein Green 
indicated to Wall that he had advised Gary Wright (GMW Development dba Ivory 
North) of the setback building requirements (pp. 34 & 43). It was felt by the partnership 
that they were making a sale to an experienced builder (p. 37). 
The Defendant/Appellee Green had nothing placed in the restrictive covenants as 
to the special considerations of Lot 31 which is the lot in question herein (Ex. 2 
Plaintiffs Resp. Memo, p. 34). Defendant/Appellee Green spoke with Wright and 
advised him to place the house as far South on the lot as possible (p. 36). 
The soils report accomplished by Glenn Maughan was very explicit in setting 
forth the deficiencies of Lot 31. Among other things, it reflected the scarp as well as the 
undercutting of the bank by Kays Creek which lent itself to the instability detailed by Mr. 
Maughan. The undercutting had caused what Mr. Maughn described as a land fall, in 
other words, a falling away of the land soil by reason of the undercutting of Kays Creek. 
His directions were very explicit as to the instability (Ex. 5 & 6, Plaintiffs Resp. Memo). 
The lot upon which Plaintiffs/Appellant's residence was built was acquired by 
GMW Development dba Ivory North from Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green by 
virtue of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement which was variously executed in May and 
June of 1995 (Ex. 9 Real Estate Purchase Agreement, Plaintiffs Resp. Memo). 
Plaintiff/Appellant Fennell, before signing the first offer of purchase on May 18, 
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1995, walked on and looked at Lot 31 of Falcon Ridge Subdivision which lot was 
smooth with neither visible defects nor any indication of a scarp, gorge, or unstable 
condition and was not informed as to the geological report with the land having been 
subject to landslides (See Ex. 8, para 5, p. 2 Plaintiffs Memo in Resp. to SJ.). 
Plaintiff/Appellant Fennell knew that Lot 31 was a subdivided lot and that 
Defendant/Appellee GMW Development was a professional builder and developer and 
he relied upon that judgment and professionalism to allow the lot to be purchased from 
Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green (at p. 2, para 6). GMW Development dba Ivory 
North selected the placement of the home on the lot and the title was transferred on 
December 22, 1995. On April 12, 1998, the PlaintiftfAppellant Fennell first observed 
landslides on the North part of the lot which was the first notice to him of any problem 
with the lot (At p. 3, para 7 through 9). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In 1991, Plaintiff/Appellant undertook a search to find a suitable residential lot 
and have a new home constructed thereon. Plaintiff/Appellant contacted 
Defendant/Appellee GMW Development dba Ivory North but the development of Ivory 
North did not have a suitable lot for Plaintiffs/Appellant's tastes which the abutting 
development of the Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green did have. The lot in question 
had been singled out of the development by a soils engineer stating that it was unstable 
and recommended that it be utilized as an access road as opposed to a building lot. The 
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instability of the lot was an inherent defect which should have been disclosed to 
Plaintiff/Appellant. In any event, Plaintiff/Appellant selected that lot and 
Defendant/Appellee GMW Development dba Ivory North purchased the lot from 
Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green and constructed Plaintiff/Appellant's home 
thereon including the lot purchase cost in the value of the cost to Plaintiff/Appellant of 
the home construction as a package. Ivory North was advised to place the home as far to 
the South from the unstable ground as possible, which did not occur. The 
Defendants/Appellees had a duty to disclose the unstable nature of the residential lot, 
which did not occur. Further, Defendant/Appellee GMW Development dba Ivory North 
as a developer had the same duties as Defendant/Appellees Wall and Green to determine 
the suitability of the lot and advise Plaintiff Appellant of any deficiencies. That did not 
occur. 
The instability of the lot is caused by the undercutting of Kays Creek which 
cannot be rectified or prevented. 
In February 1998, the hillside fell away from the residential lot. Such was not 
discernable by Plaintiff Appellant upon his initial inspection of the lot in that the 
unevenness of the scarp had been bladed over and smoothed so that the appearance of the 
land was that of a stable and firm residential building lot. 
Defendants/Appellees had a duty to provide a stable residential lot to 
Plaintiff Appellant without the inherent defect or in the alternative to inform 
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Plaintifi7Appellant as to the inherent defect. Having failed to do so the 
Plaintiff/Appellant is entitled to remedial relief. 
The Court abrogated its duty in determining that it desired a direction from the 
Appellate Court as to what law to apply to the facts. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
The applicable law of the case deals with that of actionable willful 
misrepresentation or failure to disclose. As to the issue of such tort liability, the common 
law obligation is that every person must so act and use that which he controls as not to 
injure another. Whether he is acting on his own behalf or for another, an agent who 
violates a duty which he owes to a third person is answerable to the injured party for the 
consequences. See 3 Am. Jur. 2d. Agency Sec. 309. In this instance, Plaintiff7Appellant 
is a third-party injured by the failure of Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green to 
adequately record or notate the land defect which resulted in the ultimate damage for 
which Plaintiff/Appellant pursues his remedies. Such duty applies as well to 
Defendant/Appellee GMW Development dba Ivory North as a contractor subdivider as 
defined by 57-11-2 (8), (9), and (10), UCA. 
Further statutory authority binding both Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green 
relates to Section 48-1-8, Utah Code Annotated. That provides that the admissions of a 
partner are binding upon a partnership. Defendant/Appellee Wall acknowledged that one 
means of having accomplished the necessary protections would have been to have put in 
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the protective covenants that any building on the property should be per the soils reports. 
Essentially, Defendant/Appellee Wall acknowledges a duty to disclose and admitted a 
failure to having accomplished any such disclosure. However, Defendants/Appellees 
Wall and Green both state that a conversation was had with Defendant/Appellee GMW 
Development dba Ivory North in the person of Wright advising Wright to place the house 
as far south on the lot in order to avoid the issue as to the instability of the soils as far as 
the residence was concerned. 
Plaintiff/Appellant Fennell seeks damages and equitable relief in his undertaking 
the lawsuit herein. The case of Elder v. Clawson, 384 P.2d 802 (Utah 1963), supports 
the position of Plaintiff/Appellant Fennell in his seeking remedial measures. The case 
resulted in the rescission of a land contract purchase for fraud by reason of the failure to 
disclose a quarantine on farm ground which materially effected the economic operation 
of the farm. Therein was stated "The principle is basic in the law of fraud as it relates to 
nondisclosure that a charge of fraud is maintainable where a party who knows material 
facts is under a duty, under the circumstances, to speak and disclose information, but 
remains silent....", at p.383. The land instability in the instant case is similarly a material 
defect as to which there was a duty to disclose. 
With the discussion of Defendant/Appellee Green as to the placing of the 
residence as far back on the lot as possible, notice inquiry gave rise to a duty on the part 
of the Defendant/Appellee GMW Development dba Ivory North in the person of Wright 
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to make reasonable inquiry. Wright therefore has responsibility for failing in his "duty to 
exercise" reasonable inquiry to insure that a lot is suitable for construction of some type 
of dwelling and he must disclose to his purchaser any condition which he knows or 
reasonably ought to know makes the subdivided lot unsuitable for such. See Loveland v. 
Orem City, 746 P.2d 763 (1987 Utah) at 769; UCA 57-11-17. 
Furthermore, returning to the issue of liability for negligent representation, privity 
of contract is not a necessary prerequisite to liability for negligent misrepresentation. See 
Price-Orem Inc. v. Rollins, Brown, & Gunnell, 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986). 
Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green are partners and co-developers of Falcon 
Ridge Subdivision. The liability of either of them for the partnership is the liability of 
both of them in the partnership. Section 48-1-10, UCA; 59 Am. Jur. 2d. Sec. 647 et. seq. 
In the present instance, the liability is the wrongful act of either party in failing to assure 
the disclosure of the material defect of the scarp of the real estate in question. The 
nondisclosure was intentional by omission and indeed the scarp was covered when the 
Plaintiff/Appellant walked the property so that such was not discernable. As alleged in 
the Complaint, all the elements of fraud are present and are alleged and the intentional 
nondisclosure is a wrongful act on the part of the partnership whether accomplished by 
Defendants/Appellees Wall or Green. In order for them to have placed 
Plaintiff7Appellant on notice, Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green needed to place 
information concerning the scarp in the subdivision's restrictive covenants, in the Deed, 
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recording the condition in. ti le Count} Recorder ""s Office .„ oi disclosing in the R eal Estate 
I : i- %: -t-. • , . ' iff/Appellant. None of 
that notice was accomplished. 
Nor was there any conduct which would have caused inquiry notice to 
PlaintiffTAppellant I here were no h< L ni * iiuunsMiii <>s Ikil JIIIM luu ,\l id J 
Plaintiff/Appellant to an) c oncern as to the stability of the property. The term "matter of 
public record" includes only those matters identified by statute incident to county 
recording and title documents. See First American Title Insurance Company v, J.B. 
Ranch i m , %t» II".Jit) K U (I H.ih I'l'Hi) .• • , • .. . • .- • 
1lie partnership of Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green had a duty to disclose 
the material defect of the land to GMW Development and the failure to do so resulted in 
injury to Plaintifi7Appellant herein. From the standpoint of a person injuj w. : L \Q 
wrong!MI ml Il < iiilllii i iilllln u 'Lii innslnp nl 'pii ik ' ip ' i l .nul ,i" ill i uni * •• * 
shiltiu o f the w r o n g d o e r in tha t connec t ion is o f n o consequence . 3 A m . Jur. 2d. A g e n c y 
Sec. 309. 
With Plaintiff/Appellant having walked the property and having inspeclci! il, llicie 
1
 \.IIIS in iisilili' iiiclii:a(iuii ui ;i scarp m ui.sliihilitv Plaintiff/Appellant Pennell thereafter 
entered into a contract with GMW for GMW to purchase the lot and pass title to 
Plaintiff/Appellant once the home was constructed thereon. Plaintiff7Appellant relied to 
his detriment upon the nondisclosure of the soil instability. Essentially thei e & as 
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expressed or implied authority for Defendant/Appellee GMW Development dba Ivory 
North to act on behalf of the Plaintiff/Appellant in acquiring the property. See Distan v. 
Enviro Pack Medical Products, Inc., 833 P.2d 1071 (Utah App. 1995); Zions First 
National Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 1988); Walker Bank v. 
Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 1983). 
Summary Judgment is inappropriate as a general proposition to resolve a 
negligence claim on its merits, and should be employed only in a most clearcut case. See 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821 (Utah App. 1989), Cert, denied, 789 
P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). That case involved a question of fact as to the duty of care of a 
Trustee under a Trust Deed and as to whether or not the Trustee had breached a duty it 
owed by reconveying a Trust Deed based on a forged authorization. The Court held that 
such precluded a Summary Judgment in favor of the Trustee. The Court of Appeals in 
Wycalls, at 825, stated, 
The Summary Judgment challenged here disposes of what 
amounts to a negligence claim by Wycalis against Guardian... 
Specifically, Wycalis contends that Guardian breached its duty as 
Trustee under the Trust Deed in reconveying Wycalis's interest without 
her actual authorization. As a general proposition, summary judgment 
is inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on it merits, and should 
be employed "only in the most clearcut case." (Citations Omitted). Of 
particular concern is the precept that "[o]rdinarily, whether a Defendant 
has breached the required standard of care is a question of fact for the 
jury." (Citations Omitted). Accordingly, Summary Judgment is 
inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is "fixed by law," 
(Citations Omitted) if reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion 
as to the Defendant's negligence under the circumstances. (Citations 
Omitted). Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has held that since 
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summary disposition denies the losing party "the privilege of a trial," 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution suggests that "doubt or 
uncertainty as to the questions of negligence. . . should be resoh ed in • • 
favor of granting. , . a trial." (Citations Omitted). 
Based upon the foregoing, the Appellate Court overturned the Trial Court's granting of a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Inasmuch as the theoi } ' of i eco\ ei y • :)ii tl le pai it : f tl: i = Plaintiff/. \ ppellant hei eiii Is 
11 I »I'd egligent and/or intentional failure to disclose an inherent defect, such should 
preclude the Summary Judgment and warrants the overturning of the Trial Court's 
granting of the Summary Judgments to Defendants/Appellees. 
p
 763 (1987 Utah), which discussed the scope of the duty of a nonbuilder/subdivider 
(which would be Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green herein) to subdividees and cites 
with approval the Wyoming Case of Anderson v Bower, 681 1 '.2d 131 6 ( to > oming 
l^ lvlji 1 11 • i ,'"'I in lei son t;a»(\ supm l)cliiiKliinl,'Mi ^dupei pmio/Iiasal
 tws iiiTea^e and 
subdivided the same into residential building lots. These lots were, in turn, sold to 
Defendant builders who constructed homes thereon that were later purchased by eight (8) 
Plaintiff owners. Plaintiffs sued the Subdivider/Builder for negligence and bi each of • . 
wairanh alia I \ ing oxpenciicril w afa1 soepape info their basements. The Anderson •-. 
Court held that "the developer has a duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that the 
subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type ordinary, average dwelling 
house; and he must disclose to his purchaser any conditio! I v Iiicli he kno vv s or 
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reasonably ought to know makes the unsubdivided lots unsuitable for such residential 
building." 
The Utah Court in Loveland, supra, at 769, adopted by incorporation the 
Anderson case, supra, utilizing the following language, "The duty defined by the 
Wyoming Court and our interpretation thereof is consistent with existing Utah Law." 
The Utah Court went on to state that the provisions of the Uniform Land Sales Practices 
Act are persuasive in fashioning the duty of a subdivider to his vendees. That would 
relate to 57-11-7, UCA, which requires Ml and accurate disclosure of physical 
characteristics of subdivided land which physical characteristics must be made known to 
residential purposes if there are unusual or material circumstances. 
Loveland, supra, at page 769, further states "... modern courts have held the 
purchasers of real estate may recover from a contractor for his or her negligence despite 
the lack of privity." 
The recording statute in 57-3-102 UCA, sets forth what would impart notice. 
Those requirements relate to recording disclosure as to the scarp which is the nature of 
the material and unusual circumstance as to the lot of Plaintiff7Appellatit Fennell herein. 
Such notice could only be imparted by a notation on the deed of transference, a notation 
on the development plat, or specific written notice to Plaintiff7Appellant Fennell, none of 
which were present herein. 
To revisit Elder v. Clawson, supra at 383 "the proposition that whether a duty to 
16 
speak exists is determinable by reference to all the circumstances of the case and by 
C 0 i ; i [ a n M L . *i .;•.. 
A s applicable to the case herein, the scarp and instability of the land bore directly 
upon the suitability of the property for the construction of the residence of 
Plaintiff7Appellant Fennell. 
1
 h • ill!11, 'filisi'losiin w ,'f " siniihfh sc( Ibilli ii1 111*,1 AI r l ; i t\;isr I>I S(t'f>ttnt>\ r 
Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979). In Stepanov, supra, at 35, the Court recited, 
"One of those controls (of large scale subdividers) is civil liability when subdividers fail 
to disclose to a purchaser a < .. ,. jnaractenstu . • . . .: (nima 
ft: ost \ \ ii ich ad \ erselj < • J • 11 n ; -. \ •» • -.•. -•. s 
specifically recited in Loveland, supra, and goes to an implied warranty of suitability, or 
in (liis case, usability of the residential lot for its expressed purpose. 
) <jrt)iv:i iii developing tne duty or disclosure, „ \ . .. ».iciui.,. ^ \pj-cL. 
dividers. 
Defendants/Appellees were developing abutting large developments. In the process of 
doing so, Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green obtained a soils report which disclosed 
the unstable soil romliluin VI illiiuiilli lliic .lilulois dust Insnu h\ tn uidini* pics liiii ! 
av i f a i lilt purchaser ofs i id i Innd, Plaintiff/Appellant Fennell herein,- is not subjected to 
caveat emptor by reason of the inherent defect that was not readily discernable by 
Plaintiff/Appellant Fennell in the exercise of reasonable care. See Mitchell v. 
Christensen, 429 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (SC 2001). Mitchell, supra, goes on to recite the 
Ohio case dealing with specialized knowledge in the field of construction or real estate. 
Mitchell, supra, at 16, so posited and went on to say, "See, e.g., Tipton v. Nuzum, 616 
N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ohio Ct App.1992) (holding that "buyers should be accorded 'the 
benefit of comparison with ordinarily prudent persons of their station and experience 
confronted by the same or similar circumstances'" {Trovers v. Long 135 N.E.2d 256, 259 
(Ohio 1956)); Quashnockv. Frost, 445 A.2d 121, 127 (PA Super Ct 1982) (Finding duty 
of disclosure where defect would not have been discoverable by an ({'ordinary 
inexperienced person"))', See also, Restatement 2d of Torts, Sec. 551 CMT. 1, illus.9 
(1977) (Stating that duty to disclose defects exists where "A- knows that B is not aware of 
(the defect), that he could not discover it by an ordinary inspection, and that he would 
not make the purchase if he knew it"); 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit Sec. 158, at 217 
(1968) (Stating that the buyer of property cannot charge the seller with fraud for failure 
to disclose a defect if the defect "could be discovered by such an examination as a careful 
and prudent man would ordinarily make"). Having said that, Defendant/Appellee GMW 
dba Ivory North, even for purposes of argument having not been advised of the 
instability of the land, was of "sufficient and similar expertise" as that of 
Defendants/Appellees of Wall and Green and therefore had a greater duty of care and 
indeed should be held to the notice as to the soils report disclosed with 
Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green having filed the soils report with the Layton City 
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Offices. 
Clawson, 
There [is] no occasion for [purchasers] to make an independent 
investigation of a [problem] of which they kn [o]w nothing." 14 IIt all 
2d 379, 382, 384 P.2d 802, 804 (1963) " 
In exjii)"i(ii(»ij;» ilif 11u in: i i ( 'nui I \ initial basis for the granting of the Summary 
Judgment, the ruling was that because the Plaintiff/Appellant did not line item for line 
item repeat and contest the fact statement of Defendant/Appellee Green, that fact 
statement was taken as
 u n c o n t r o v e r t ed . 
I he Cc i ii I: in so n llii lg abrogated its-duties as the Trial Court in what would 
ultimately be the finder of fact. The code of judicial administration is not meant to create 
or modify substantive rights of litigants but to bring order to the manner in which the 
Courts operate. SeeAin-n i 1/II/HM III11'1"' ni.ili pp h ' i ll^0 I' Jci 'III I nil <l< nn il 
994 P "71 (Utah 1999), Therein, the I Jtah Court of Appeals affirmed the granting of 
a Motion for Summary Judgment as the nonmovant failed to file counter Affidavits and 
other evidentiary materials in response to the Motion for Summary Judgment 1 s is 
for Summary Judgment, substantial evidentiary material was submitted including the 
Affidavit of Plaintiff/Appellant Fennell, excerpts of depositions of the parties 
Defendants/Appellees Wall and Green, deposition of the soils engineer, the soils 
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engineer report, and a soil disputation of the fact position of the Defendant/Appellee 
Green. 
Scott, supra, at 217, went on to recite, 
The purpose of the Code of Judicial Administration is to bring 
order to the manner in which the Courts operate. They are not intended 
to, nor do they, create or modify substantive rights of litigants... Cf. 
Hartford Leasing Corporation., 888 P.2d. at 702. 
By way of further elucidation, Scott dealt with a real estate purchase contract 
whereby the purchaser sued for specific performance. The Appellate Court granted same 
to purchaser and affirming the conveyance of the property to purchaser. The decision 
was based upon the fact that the Defendant/Appellee in the Scott matter failed to file 
counter Affidavits or other evidentiary materials as required by Rule 56 (e). 
The specific provisions upon which the Court relied in its treatment of the motions 
under Rule 4-501, CJA, were "contains a verbatim restatement" and "and, if applicable, 
shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed." 
In both instances, this precise language was the November 2001, amendment. N.B. The 
motions were filed and responded to in the spring of 2001, and argument on the matter 
was held October 25, 2001. A fortiori, this appeal is warranted based upon the Trial 
Court's premature and precipitous application of the rule. 
Applying those circumstances to the case herein, the Court abused its discretion in 
refusing to acknowledge the Memorandum of Plaintiff/Appellant Fennell controverting 
the Memorandum of Defendant/Appellee Green. 
20 
In dealing with a Motion for Summary Judgment, the adverse part)' is entillul lo 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the adverse party. Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 
123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (1953); Thompson v. Ford Motor Company, 16 I Jtah 2d 305 
395 1 \2( 162(196 1 )::; Bowen v. Riverton C ity, 656 I 2d = 1 35(1 Jul : ih 1982) Fi if till: u : t: 
submission1* HI • ipp nil m nppnsiiinn hi a Motion (or Summary J udgment should be 
looked at in the light favorable to the nonmoving parties position. Duram v. Margetts, 
557 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 16! I1 d 
A 2 \\ I k i l n 1 1 , ; \\\\\ I11 "KM |i • • . . . . ' ' ' ' " '•'•."' 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff/Appellant seeks the reversal of the Trial Court ' s granting of the 
Defendants/Appellants' Motions for Summary Judgment. 
F R A N K M. WELLS ~ 
Attorney for Plaintiff?Appellant 
CERTIFICA TE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above-entitled 
Docking Statement has been served upon the Defendants by placing same in the US 
Postal Service, postage prepaid this 11th day of January, 2002, to: 
Paul Belnap 
Andrew D. Wright 
Attorneys for Defendant Green 
Sixth Floor 
Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Elizabeth Hruby-Mills 
Brandon B. Hobbs 
Attorneys for Defendant Wall 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-5506 
Dave Hamilton 
Another attorney for Neil Wall 
4723 Harrison Blvd. #200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Barbara Berrett 
Shane Norris 
Attorneys for Defendant GMW 
Key Bank Tower 
50 South Main Street, Ste. 530 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
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ADDENDUM 
Paul M. Belnap, #0279 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Edward D. Green 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES ASHLEY FENNELL, U, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
EDWARD D. GREEN, NEIL WALL, aka 
NEIL J. WALL and GMW DEVELOPMENT, 
INC.. dba IVORY NORTH, 
Defendant 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DISMISSAL OF EDWARD D. 
GREEN AND NEIL WALL, aka 
NEIL J. WALL 
Civil No. 000601295 PD 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 25th day of October, 2001 at the 
hour of 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District Court Judge on motions for 
summary judgment, including motions for summary judgment filed by Edward D. Green and 
Neil Wall, aka Neil J. Wall (hereinafter "Green and Wall"). 
The plaintiff was represented by his counsel of record and the defendants were 
represented by their counsel of record. 
The Court reviewed the memoranda in support of and in opposition to the motions 
and has reviewed the case law cited by the parties and having considered the same and the oral 
argument of counsel presented in favor o'f and in opposition to the motions, determined that the 
motions for summary judgment of Green and Wall should be and are hereby granted, dismissing 
the complaint of the plaintiff against them. The Court desires to set forth its reasoning for the 
granting of the motions for summary judgment of Green and Wall and provided explanation for 
the same at the time of ruling on the motions at the hearing and confirms the same as the basis 
for its ruling together with this statement of the reasons in this written Order. 
1. The time of the motions for summary judgment was appropriate as the parties had 
completed their discovery in this case giving the attorneys the opportunity to know the issues and 
facts. 
2. The Court believes that under the terms of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, together with Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration, that summary 
judgment is warranted as the court determines from the pleadings filed and the matters presented 
that there are no genuine issues as to any material facts and that Green and Wall are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
3. Rule 4-501(2)(B) is a rule that this Court has relied upon and does so in this case 
as a separate basis for the granting of the motions for summary judgment dismissing Green and 
Wall. In the materials filed by Green and Wall in support of their motions, said parties listed the 
facts by paragraphs which they contended were not in dispute. The rule required the plaintiff to 
set forth specifically: 
[A] concise statement of material facts as to which the party 
contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be 
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stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically 
refer to those portions of die record upon which the 
opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the 
numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that 
are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's 
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference 
to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of 
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the 
opposing party's statement 
The Court determines that the plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 4-501(2)(B) and 
therefore the facts set forth in the memoranda filed by Green and Wall in support of their motions 
are deemed admitted and make summary judgment proper under the facts and circumstances of 
the legal arguments made. 
4. As a separate basis for the granting of the motions of Green and Wall, the Court 
has reviewed Exhibit 4 to the deposition of Neil J. Wall together with the deposition referred to 
and referenced by the parties of Glenn Roy Maughan. The Court determines that there are no 
genuine issues as to any material facts regarding the fact that at the time Maughan performed his 
soils studies on the lots in the proposed subdivision, including Lot 21, which became Lot 31 on 
the subsequent plan (see deposition Exhibits 1 and 5 of the Deposition of Neil J. Wall), Maughan 
was of the opinion that the area of the hill on the north side of Lot 31 was not a landslide. 
Accordingly. Green and Wall did not have knowledge of an alleged landslide condition as 
plaintiff now alleges, at the time that the subdivision was platted and the subject lot was sold to 
defendants GMW and Ivory North. Therefore, Green and Wall did not fail to disclose the alleged 
landslide condition now complained of by the plaintiff- This court determines from the facts 
3 
deemed admitted together with the facts set forth in Exhibit 4 of the Neil J. Wall deposition and 
the deposition of Glenn Roy Maughan, do not indicate there was a landslide condition that would 
have been known to Green and Wall at the times in question, as alleged by the plaintiffs. 
5. As a matter of law, plaintiff has also foiled to state a claim in his pleadings for 
fraudulent non-disclosure and further, even if such a cause of action had been pled, there has 
been a failure to establish that the alleged non-disclosed information was known to Green and 
Wall. Further, plaintiff has failed to establish a legal duty on the part Green and Wall to 
communicate with the plaintiff. 
6. It is undisputed that Green and Wall did not sell the subject lot to the plaintiff, and 
plaintiff has failed to establish facts from which this court would find a legal duty to the plaintiff. 
7. In the case before this court, the only issues of damage involved are those of 
economic loss for which no recovery is available under the theories pled by the plaintiff in this 
action, whether in negligence or alleged warranty proposed by plaintiff. 
8. Plaintiff has not provided the Court with a basis to determine that there were any 
concealed conditions known to Green and Wall at the time of the sale to GMW/Ivory and further, 
the plaintiff was outside the land at the time of the damages alleged. Therefore, the exceptions to 
the doctrine of caveat emptor, urged by plaintiff do not exist in this case. Accordingly, the Court 
determines that the cases cited and relied upon by the parties support the granting of summary 
judgment to Green and Wall. 
9. The Court has spent considerable time reviewing the memoranda of the parties 
4 
and the case law and in ruling on the motions at the subject hearing did so, having first fully 
reviewed all matters submitted and having considered the oral argument of counsel and the legal 
precedent and rules stated herein. Therefore, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motions for 
Summary Judgment of Green and Wall are granted and the claims of the plaintiff against Green 
and Wall are hereby dismissed with prejudice, costs to defendants. 
DATED this day of November, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
Thomas L. Kay 
Second District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
Py^LaVarE. Stark 
| Attorney for Plaintiff 
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BARBARA K. BERRETT (A4273) 
SHANE W. NORRIS (A8097) 
BERRETT & PETTY, L.C. 
Attorneys for GMW Development, Inc., 
d/b/a Ivory North 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 530 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 531-7733 
Facsimile: (801) 531-7711 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES ASHLEY FENNELL, H. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWARD D. GREEN, NEIL WALL, a/k/a 
NEIL J. WALL and GMW 
DEVELOPMENT, INC., d/b/a IVORY 
NORTH, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DISMISSAL OF GMW DEVELOPMENT, 
INC., dba IVORY NORTH 
Civil No. 000601295 PD 
Judge Thomas Kay 
Defendant GMW Development, Inc. d/b/a Ivory North ("Ivory North") filed a 
motion for summary judgment, seeking judgment as a matter of law on all of plaintiffs' causes of 
action against defendant Ivory North. 
Defendant Ivory North's motion for summary judgment came on regularly for 
hearing on October 25, 2001. Plaintiff was represented by LaVar E. Stark and Frank M. Wells. 
Defendant Ivory North was represented by Shane W. Norris. Defendant Neil Wall was 
represented by Elizabeth Hruby-Mills, Defendant Edward D. Green was represented by Paul M. 
Belnap. 
The Court reviewed the submitted memoranda and heard the oral argument of counsel. 
Based on the foregoing, and for the reasons set forth in the memoranda filed by Ivory Norths 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
14 Defendant Ivory North's motion for summary judgment is granted on all 
causes of action. 
This Court further holds that 
2. Once discovery is completed and issues are fully developed, motions for 
summary judgment are proper. 
3. Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration is applicable, and that a 
non-moving party must dispute the factual statements set forth by the moving party in order to 
defeat a motion for summary judgment 
4. The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to property dispute the relevant 
facts set forth in Ivory North's Motion for Summary Judgment and therefore Ivory North's 
Statement of Undisputed Facts are deemed admitted due to the lack of response. 
5. Ivory North's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted based upon 
plaintiffs failure to dispute the relevant facts set forth in Ivory North's Motion for Summary 
2 
Judgment. 
6. Specifically, this Court finds that it is undisputed that Ivory North had no 
knowledge of any geological condition on the subject property, had no knowledge of the 
Maughan report or evaluation of the subject property, and had no knowledge of the possibility of 
the subject property being the site of potential landslides. 
7. Additionally, Maughan stated that the subject property was not a landslide 
area in deposition, therefore no defendants had any knowledge of the subject property being the 
site of potential landslides. 
8. Finally, this Court finds that regardless of the knowledge of the 
defendants, plaintiff cannot claim economic damages for negligence. 
9. Plaintiffs claim for breach of implied warranty must fail based upon the 
lack of implied warranty in Utah law for residential property. 
DATED this of December, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
Thomas L. Kay 
Second District Court Judge 
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57-U-7 REAL ESTATE 
57-11-7. PubKc offering statement — Contents — Restric-
tions on use — Alteration or amendments. 
(1) Every public offering statement shall disclose completely and accurately 
to prospective purchasers: 
(a) the physical characteristics of the subdivided lands offered; and 
(b) unusual and material circumstances or features affecting the sub-
divided lands. 
(2) The proposed public offering statement submitted to the division shall be 
in a form prescribed by its rules and, unless otherwise provided by the division, 
shall include the following: 
(a) the name and principal address of the subdivider and the name and 
principal address of each officer, director, general partner, other principal, 
or person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions as 
defined by the rules of the division if the subdivider is a person other than 
an individual; 
(b) a general description of the subdivided lands stating the total 
number of units in the offering; 
(c) a statement summarizing in one place the significant terms of any 
encumbrances, easements, hens, severed interests, and restrictions, in-
cluding zoning and other regulations affecting the subdivided lands and 
each unit, and a statement of all existing or proposed taxes or special 
assessments which affect the subdivided lands; 
(d) a statement of the use for which the property is offered; 
(e) information concerning: 
(i) any improvements, including streets, curbs, and gutters, side-
walks, water supply including a supply of culinary water, drainage 
and flood control systems, irrigation systems, sewage disposal facili-
ties, and customary utilities; 
(ii) the estimated cost to the purchaser, the estimated date of 
completion, and the responsibility for construction and maintenance 
of existing and proposed improvements which are referred to in 
connection with the offering or disposition; and 
(iii) if for any reason any of the improvements described in Subsec-
tions (i) and (ii) cannot presently be constructed or maintained, a 
statement clearly setting forth this fact and giving the reasons 
therefor, 
(f) (i) a statement of existing zoning or other planned land use desig-
nation of each unit and the proposed use of each unit in the 
subdivision including uses as residential dwellings, agriculture, 
churches, schools, low density apartments, high density apartments 
and hotels, and a subdivision map showing the proposed use, the 
zoning, or other planned land use designation, unless each unit has 
the same proposed use, zoning, or other planned land use designation; 
(ii) if the subdivision consists of more than one tract or other 
smaller division, the information and map required by Subsection (i) 
need only pertain to the tract or smaller division in which the units 
offered for disposition are located; 
(g) a map, which need not be drawn to scale, enabling one unfamiliar 
with the area in which the subdivision is located to reach the subdivision 
by road or other thoroughfare from a nearby town or city; 
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(h) (i) the boundary, course, dimensions, and intended use of the 
right-of-way and easement grants of record; 
(ii) the location of existing underground and utility facilities; and 
(iii) any conditions or restrictions governing the location of the 
facilities within the right-of-way, and easement grants of record, and 
utility facilities within the subdivision; and 
(i) any additional information the division may require to assure full 
and fair disclosure to prospective purchasers. 
(3) (a) The public offering statement may not be used for any promotional 
purposes either before registration of the subdivided lands or before the 
date the statement becomes effective. 
(b) The statement may be used after it becomes effective only if it is 
used in its entirety. 
(c) A person may not advertise or represent that the division aipproves 
or recommends the subdivided lands or their disposition. 
(d) No portion of the public offering statement may be underscored, 
italicized, or printed in larger, heavier, or different color type than the 
remainder of the statement, unless the division requires it. 
(4) (a) The division may require the subdivider to alter or amend the 
proposed public offering statement in order to assure full smd fair 
disclosure to prospective purchasers. 
(b) A change in the substance of the promotional plan or plan of 
disposition or development of the subdivision may not be made after 
registration without notifying and receiving approval of the division and 
without making appropriate amendment of the public offering statement. 
(c) A public offering statement is not current unless: 
(i) all amendments are incorporated; 
(ii) the subdivider has timely filed each renewal report required by 
Section 57-11-10; and 
(iii) no cease and desist order issued pursuant to this chapter is in 
effect. 
(5) The subdivider must notify the division within five working days if he is 
convicted of a crime involving fraud, deception, false pretenses, misrepresen-
tation, false advertising, or dishonest dealing in real estate transactions, or 
has been subject to any injunction or administrative order restraining a false 
or misleading promotional plan involving land dispositions. 
(6) The subdivider must notify the division within five working days if the 
person which owns the subdivided lands files a petition in bankruptcy or if any 
other event occurs which may have a material adverse effect on the subdivi-
sion. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 158, § 7; 1991, ch. 
165, § 2; 1995, ch. 180, § 6. 
57-11-8. Examination by division on application for reg-
istration. 
Upon receipt of an application for registration in proper form, the division 
shall immediately initiate an examination to determine whether: 
(1) the requirements of Sections 57-11-6 and 57-11-7 have been satis-
fied; 
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Rule 4-408.01. Responsibility for administration of tria 
courts. 
Intent: 
To designate the court locations administered directly through the admin 
istrative office of the courts and those administered through contract with loca 
government pursuant to § 78-3-21. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the trial courts of record and to the administratis 
office of the courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) All locations of the juvenile court shall be administered directly througl 
the administrative office of the courts. 
(2) All locations of the district court shall be administered directly througl 
the administrative office of the courts, except the following, which shall b< 
administered through contract with county or municipal government pursuan 
to § 78-3-21: Fillmore, Junction, Kanab, Loa, Manila, Manti, Morgan 
Panguitch, Randolph, and Salem. 
(Added effective November 15, 1995; amended effective January 27, 1997 
November 1, 1998; November 1, 2001.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend- The 2001 amendment deleted "Coalville" an< 
ment deleted "Beaver" before "Coalville" m "Park City" from the list m Subdivision (2). 
Subdivision (2). 
ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda 
and documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings oi 
dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record excep 
proceedings before the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rul< 
does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary 
relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested o 
ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points an< 
authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number t 
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon ii 
support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall no 
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" a 
provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on ex-part 
application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memoran 
dum, the application shall state the length of the principal memorandum, an< 
if the memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the application shall include < 
summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party shall fil 
and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, < 
memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation 
If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to the motioi 
within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party may notify th 
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clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as provided in paragraph 
(1XD) of this rule. 
(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply 
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's memo-
randum. 
(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day period 
to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the clerk to submit the 
matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in the form of a 
separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The 
Notice to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the motion was 
served, the date the memorandum in opposition, if any, was served, the date 
the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been 
requested. The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. 
If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment 
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in 
support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant contends no 
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences 
and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the 
movant relies. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as 
to which the party contends a genuine issue exists followed by a concise 
statement of material facts which support the party's contention. Each 
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party 
relies. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly 
supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for 
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the 
opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless 
ordered by the court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs 
(3)(B) or (4) below. 
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or 
any claim in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time 
of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion 
may file a written request for a hearing. 
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion 
or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of 
issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively 
decided. 
(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the 
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the 
matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter shall be 
heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for hearing and 
notify all parties of the date and time. 
(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion, 
memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or 
opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at least 
two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly 
marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time of the hearing. 
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court. 
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file 
their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived. 
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(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the 
scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date 
without leave of the court. 
(H) If a hearing has been requested and the non-moving party fails to file a 
memorandum in opposition, the moving party may withdraw the request or 
the court on its own motion may strike the request and decide the motion 
without oral argument. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause 
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule 
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal 
issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request 
may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court 
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments and 
the rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; November 1, 1996; 
November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999; April 1, 2001; November 1, 2001.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment substituted "trial courts of record" for 
"district courts" in the applicability paragraph, 
added Subdivision (3)(h), and made a stylistic 
change. 
The 1999 amendment substituted "claim" for 
"issues" in Subdivision (3)(B). 
The April 2001 amendment added the second 
sentence to Subdivision (1)(D) and made stylis-
tic changes in the subdivision designations. 
FTI The November 2001 amendment, in Subdivi-
sion (2)(B), at the end of the first sentence 
'substituted the language beginning "contains a 
verbatim restatement" for "a concise statement 
of material facts as to which the party contends 
a genuine issue exists" and deleted "and, if 
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence 
jor sentences of the movant's facts that are 
disputed" at the end of the second sentence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Decisions sua sponte. 
Purpose. 
Request for hearing. 
Supplemental memoranda. 
When rule applies. 
Cited. 
Decisions sua sponte. 
While a court may refrain from addressing a 
matter that is not submitted for decision under 
this rule, nothing in this rule or any other rule 
bars a court from deciding such a matter sua 
sponte. Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App 139, 980 
P.2d 214, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 
1999). 
No notice to submit for decision under this 
rule is required, and a trial therefore correctly 
determined that it could rule on pending mo-
tions sua sponte. Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App 
139, 980 P.2d 214, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 
(Utah 1999). 
Purpose. 
The purpose of the code of judicial adminis-
tration is not to create or modify substantive 
rights of litigants, but to bring order to the 
manner in which the courts operate. Scott v. 
Majors, 1999 UT App 139, 980 P.2d 214, cert, 
denied, 994 P2d 1271 (Utah 1999). 
Request for hearing. 
Once a request for hearing by one of the 
parties has been granted and the matter set for 
hearing, the other party has a right to rely upon 
such setting regardless of whether it made its 
own request. Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251 
(Utah 1997). 
Supplemental memoranda. 
The plural "memoranda" in Subdivision (lXa) 
refers to all memoranda received by the court 
— from all parties that either oppose or support 
any motion — and does not mean that each 
party may submit more than one memoran-
dum; thus, the trial court was well within its 
discretion in refusing to accept a supplemental 
memorandum that was submitted without 
prior invitation and outside the bounds of pro-
cedural rules. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 
888 P.2d 694 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
When rule applies. 
Because the defendants' Rule 56(e) objection 
to the plaintiffs first affidavit was framed as a 
separate, written motion to strike, the plaintiff 
should have been given ten days to respond, as 
prescribed by Subdivision QXb) of this rule. 
Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 R2d 1205 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
Even though the trial court had considered 
both parties' motions and memoranda for and 
against the award of attorney fees, it erred in 
entering its decision before the time allowed 
under this rule to file a reply memorandum had 
expired and in not reconsidering its decision by 
reviewing plaintiffs' reply memorandum and 
revised affidavits. American Vending Servs., 
Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
